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School of  law
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) exhaustion 
requirement applies an administrative exhaustion require-
ment to suits challenging prison conditions. I have argued 
elsewhere that corrections rules and procedures should 
not be immune from regular administrative law princi-
ples.2 This article, inspired by Justice Breyer’s concurrence 
in Woodford v. Ngo,3 is a plea to take administrative law 
seriously in cases involving PLRA exhaustion.
The PLRA exhaustion requirement provides: “No 
action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions 
under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, 
by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correc-
tional facility until such administrative remedies as are 
available are exhausted.”4 
In 2006, in Woodford, the Supreme Court interpreted 
this provision to include a procedural default component, 
so that a procedural misstep in a prison grievance proce-
dure (e.g., a missed deadline) can preclude courts from 
hearing a prisoner’s claim.5 
Concurring in the judgment in Woodford, Justice 
Breyer, a former professor of administrative law and 
author of an influential textbook in the area,6 wrote that he 
agreed with the majority that “Congress intended the term 
‘exhausted’ to ‘mean what the term means in administra-
tive law, where exhaustion means proper exhaustion.’”7 
He explained, “I do not believe that Congress desired a 
system in which prisoners could elect to bypass prison 
grievance systems without consequences.”8 
However, Justice Breyer took the administrative law 
reasoning one step further than the majority, writing that 
“[a]dministrative law . . . contains well-established excep-
tions to exhaustion.”9 He listed some of those exceptions, 
including constitutional claims, futility, hardship, and 
“inadequate or unavailable” administrative remedies.10 
Breyer’s concurrence then noted that some courts, includ-
ing the Second Circuit, already had “concluded that the 
PLRA’s proper exhaustion requirement is not absolute.”11
This article makes the case that, as long as the statutory 
language of the PLRA remains as currently enacted, courts 
should heed Justice Breyer’s concurrence. Part I provides 
context by discussing criticisms of the PLRA exhaustion 
requirement and proposed legislative and regulatory 
reforms. Part II examines Justice Breyer’s Woodford 
concurrence and court decisions consistent with it. Build-
ing on the work of Professor Richard Pierce in his 
Administrative Law Treatise,12 and other commentators 
including John Boston,13 it argues that the PLRA invokes 
regular administrative law doctrine to the extent it is not 
inconsistent with the statute. The article concludes that Jus-
tice Breyer’s Woodford concurrence sketches the proper 
approach to interpreting the PLRA exhaustion requirement.
i.  Proposed Legislative and Regulatory Reform of  
the PLRa
Much has been written about the PLRA exhaustion 
requirement. Some advocates and commentators (and Jus-
tice Stevens in his Woodford dissent14) say that serious 
abuses will go unchecked following Woodford. They point 
to cases involving juveniles, sexual abuse, and religious 
freedom to argue for elimination of the exhaustion 
requirement.15 State attorneys general counter that with-
out an exhaustion requirement with teeth, prisoners will 
skip over administrative grievance procedures and head 
straight to court.16
Advocates have proposed a legislative solution to the 
excesses of PLRA exhaustion—simply amend the statute. 
Bills have been introduced to Congress, and the ABA sup-
ports this approach. Regulatory changes also have been 
proposed, particularly under the auspices of the Prison 
Rape Elimination Act of 2003 (PREA).17
a. Proposed Legislative amendment
The Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2009, a bill introduced 
by Rep. Robert Scott (D-VA), proposed a solution that 
required only “presentation” of a claim to corrections 
authorities within the “generally applicable statute of limi-
tations period,”18 thus doing away with any procedural 
default component added by Woodford. However, PARA 
did not completely dispense with an exhaustion require-
ment. Under the bill, courts were usually required to stay 
a prisoner’s lawsuit for ninety days if this requirement had 
not been met to permit prison officials to consider the 
grievance: whether they considered it was up to them.19 
The bill did not leave committee.20
The ABA in its 2010 Standards on the Treatment of Pris-
oners has called for rules that would permit courts to stay 
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an action for up to ninety days for a prisoner to exhaust an 
administrative grievance procedure.21 The ABA version, 
unlike PARA, does not state expressly that prisoners can 
satisfy the PLRA exhaustion provision through “present-
ing” a claim within the statute of limitations.
B. Proposed Regulatory Solutions
The PREA created a National Prison Rape Elimination 
Commission to study the problem of prison sexual vio-
lence and propose standards to the Department of Justice 
(DOJ).22 Following further notice-and-comment periods, 
the DOJ currently is in the process of finalizing its PREA 
regulations.23 During this process of promulgating PREA 
regulations, both the NPREC and the DOJ have addressed 
the issue of PLRA exhaustion.
Among the standards proposed by the NPREC in its 
2009 report was a modification of the exhaustion require-
ment in sex abuse cases. The NPREC would deem any 
complaint of sex abuse to be exhausted at the time that the 
corrections agency completed its investigation or, at the lat-
est, within ninety days of when the complaint was made.24 
Thus, in essence, the NPREC’s proposed regulations dic-
tated the meaning of “exhaustion” in cases involving 
allegations of sex abuse. The NPREC’s proposed standard 
also expressly permitted complaints from any source—
including family or outside agencies—as opposed to 
restricting complaints solely to prisoners.25 It also permit-
ted an emergency procedure, deeming an urgent request 
for protection to be exhausted within forty-eight hours.26
During the period for notice-and-comment on the pro-
posed regulations, corrections officials criticized this 
standard as inconsistent with the PLRA mandate.27 They 
further complained that such a rule “would allow filing of 
stale claims [of sexual abuse] that would be difficult to 
investigate due to the passage of time.”28
In response, the DOJ proposed PREA regulations tak-
ing a very different tack. The DOJ’s proposed regulations 
impose a twenty-day time limit in which prisoners must 
file grievances regarding sexual abuse,29 which follows the 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) time limit.30 While the NPREC 
proposal deemed complaints of sexual abuse “exhausted” 
no matter when they were filed, under the DOJ proposal, 
prisoners are permitted an extra ninety days in which to 
file a grievance if they provide documentation that filing 
within twenty days was “impractical,” due to transfer, 
trauma, or some other circumstance.31 Some commenta-
tors criticize this extension as unrealistic and unlikely to 
help prisoners in the worst situations—those subject to 
intimidation or retaliation, and those denied treatment or 
documentation.32 
The DOJ’s proposed regulations would treat com-
plaints from someone other than the prisoner as the initial 
stage of the grievance process, although unlike the 
NPREC version, the DOJ’s would require the prisoner to 
complete subsequent steps of the process.33 The DOJ regu-
lations also provide that corrections authorities should set 
up systems for the parents or guardians of juveniles to file 
complaints.34 The DOJ stopped short of adopting the 
NPREC recommendation to deem emergency requests to 
be exhausted after forty-eight hours.35 However, it did 
require agencies to establish emergency grievance proce-
dures for handling claims of imminent sexual abuse.36
Both the NPREC and the proposed DOJ PREA regula-
tions would apply only in cases involving prison sexual 
violence or custodial sexual abuse. Accordingly, they do not 
address many other important types of prison cases, such 
as excessive force, inadequate medical or mental health 
treatment, and dangerous environmental conditions.
ii. Justice Breyer’s Solution: More administrative Law
Unless the language of the PLRA is amended, and in cases 
that do not implicate the PREA regulations, courts and 
advocates should look to Justice Breyer’s Woodford concur-
rence. At first blush, Justice Breyer’s suggestion that 
courts apply regular administrative law exceptions to 
PLRA exhaustion may seem inconsistent with decisions of 
the Supreme Court interpreting the PLRA,37 particularly 
its 2001 opinion Booth v. Churner38 and its 2002 decision 
Porter v. Nussle.39 However, it can be reconciled easily if 
understood to mean that the PLRA exhaustion provision 
references administrative law principles that are not 
inconsistent with the statute.
The opinion in Booth, in particular, appears at least 
superficially discordant with Justice Breyer’s Woodford 
concurrence.40 In Booth, the Court concluded that the 
PLRA exhaustion is required even if the prisoner seeks a 
remedy, such as money damages, that cannot be obtained 
in the prison grievance system.41 The prisoner in Booth 
and his amici had argued that exhaustion should not be 
required in this situation under the traditional futility 
exception to administrative exhaustion requirements.42 
The Court rejected this claim, concluding that the PLRA 
mandated exhaustion “regardless of the relief offered 
through administrative procedures.”43 In the final footnote 
of the opinion, the Court explained, “[W]e will not read 
futility or other exceptions into statutory exhaustion 
requirements where Congress has provided otherwise.”44
The decision in Booth was followed the next year by 
Porter. While “[o]rdinarily, plaintiffs pursuing civil rights 
claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 need not exhaust adminis-
trative remedies before filing suit in court,”45 the Porter 
Court acknowledged that the PLRA mandates administra-
tive exhaustion in “all inmate suits about prison life.”46 
In reaching its conclusion in Porter, the Supreme Court 
contrasted the PLRA exhaustion provision with its 
predecessor, enacted in 1980 in the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (CRIPA).47 The 1980 CRIPA 
exhaustion provision vested courts with discretion to stay 
prisoners’ suits for up to 180 days to permit exhaustion of 
administrative remedies, if the court believed it “appropri-
ate and in the interests of justice” and the prison grievance 
procedure was certified as “plain, speedy, and effective” 
under federal standards.48 The PLRA exhaustion provi-
sion, wrote Justice Ginsburg, “differ[ed] markedly from its 
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predecessor.”49 Under the PLRA, exhaustion was “manda-
tory,” rather than discretionary, and required regardless of 
whether grievance procedures met federal standards.50
Against this backdrop, the result in Booth can be 
understood as the Court’s recognition of Congress’s 
implicit overruling of the pre-PLRA opinion McCarthy v. 
Madigan.51 In McCarthy, the question was whether a fed-
eral prisoner seeking money damages was required to 
exhaust BOP grievance procedures.52 The McCarthy Court 
rejected the argument that CRIPA indicated a congressio-
nal preference for exhaustion, in part because CRIPA 
applied to state but not federal prisoners,53 and also 
because the “effective administrative remedies” language 
of the CRIPA statute excluded grievance procedures that 
did not provide the relief sought by the inmate.54 The 
Court noted in McCarthy that “Congress has not meaning-
fully addressed the appropriateness of requiring 
exhaustion in this context.”55 It concluded that the inmate 
was not required to exhaust.56 Four years after McCarthy, 
Congress passed the PLRA, eliminating the reference to 
“plain, speedy, and effective” administrative remedies in 
CRIPA.57 Analyzing the amended statute in Booth in 2001, 
the Court wrote, “It has to be significant that Congress 
removed the very term we had previously emphasized in 
reaching the result Booth now seeks, and the fair infer-
ence to be drawn is that Congress meant to preclude the 
McCarthy result.”58
However, the fact that the PLRA imposes an “invigo-
rated” exhaustion requirement59 and makes exhaustion 
“mandatory” rather than a matter of judicial discre-
tion60—even the fact that it requires exhaustion in cases 
involving money damages—does not mean that the stat-
ute suspends all aspects of administrative law doctrine. 
While the question of whether a prisoner must exhaust is 
no longer committed entirely to the court’s judgment, 
Professor Richard Pierce argues that the PLRA does not 
abolish established administrative law exceptions to the 
duty to exhaust.61 In his Administrative Law Treatise, Pierce 
explains: “Courts interpret general references to the duty 
to exhaust as mere codifications of the common law duty, 
subject to the usual pragmatic judge-made exceptions to 
the duty.”62 Surveying case law, Pierce concludes that the 
PLRA “codifies the common law duty to exhaust,” rather 
than creating an “independent, jurisdictional, statutory 
duty to exhaust.”63 Pierce writes that Breyer’s Woodford 
concurrence directs the lower court to “determine whether 
the plaintiff’s complaint fell within an exception to the 
duty to exhaust that Congress implicitly incorporated in 
the statute at issue.”64 After a review of Booth, one aspect 
of Breyer’s Woodford concurrence, and of Pierce’s discus-
sion of it, seems especially deserving of emphasis: 
administrative law doctrine is incorporated into the PLRA 
exhaustion requirement to the extent that it is not inconsis-
tent with the statute.65
Justice Breyer’s concurrence cites a 2004 Second Circuit 
precedent, Giano v. Goord, as an example of how courts may 
recognize established exceptions.66 Giano recognized that 
“[s]pecial circumstances may exist that amount to a justifi-
cation for not complying with administrative procedural 
requirements.”67 However, the Second Circuit declined to 
adopt wholesale doctrine from other areas, specifically the 
law of federal habeas.68 It explained: “What is justification 
in the PLRA context for not following procedural require-
ments . . . cannot be decided by borrowing from other areas 
of the law. It must be determined by looking at the circum-
stances which might understandably lead usually 
uncounselled prisoners to fail to grieve in the normally 
required way.”69 
The same day that it decided Giano, the Second Circuit 
issued an opinion in a companion case, Hemphill v. New 
York,70 that set out a three-part framework to determine 
whether a prisoner’s failure to properly exhaust may be 
excused. Under Hemphill, a court is to inquire “whether 
administrative remedies were in fact ‘available’ to the pris-
oner,” whether defendants either failed to raise exhaustion 
or are estopped from doing so because of “actions inhibit-
ing the inmate’s exhaustion of remedies,” and whether, 
within the meaning of Giano, “special circumstances have 
been plausibly alleged that justify the prisoner’s failure to 
comply with administrative procedural requirements.”71 
The Second Circuit concluded that the test for determin-
ing whether grievance procedures were “available” is 
objective: whether “a similarly situated individual of ordi-
nary firmness [would] have deemed them available.”72 
Following Woodford, the Second Circuit noted in one case 
that it did not need to decide whether Woodford called into 
question its Hemphill framework.73 
Other circuit courts have recognized important excep-
tions to exhaustion after Woodford. Most recently, the 
Tenth Circuit in Tuckel v. Grover cited the Second Circuit, 
along with the Seventh74 and Eleventh,75 in concluding 
that “intimidation or threats by prison officials can render 
an administrative remedy unavailable under the PLRA’s 
exhaustion provision.”76 Like the Seventh and Eleventh 
Circuits,77 the Tenth Circuit tied its analysis to the “avail-
able remedies” language of the PLRA.78 Rejecting the 
defendants’ reliance on language from Woodford that 
exhaustion under the PLRA is no longer committed to 
judges’ discretion, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that  
“[t]hroughout Woodford, the Court is careful to acknowl-
edge that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies only 
to ‘available’ remedies.”79 The Tenth Circuit emphasized 
that its “holding concerns when remedies are available” 
but does not permit courts “discretion to fabricate excep-
tions” to the exhaustion requirement.80
More generally, Justice Breyer’s concurrence suggests 
that administrative law principles beyond recognized 
exceptions to exhaustion doctrine apply to PLRA exhaus-
tion. Administrative exhaustion is designed to “protect[] 
administrative agency authority” and to “promote[] effi-
ciency.”81 However, it also imposes some obligations on 
agencies. For example, Professor Pierce notes that “in a 
long line of cases, the [Supreme] Court has excused the peti-
tioner from exhausting available administrative remedies 
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the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Americans with Disabilities 
Act, and the Imperatives of  Survivor-Oriented Advocacy, 17 Va. J. 
Soc. Pol’y & l. 281 (2010); Joseph alvarado, Keeping Jailers 
from Keeping the Keys to the Courthouse: The Prison Litigation 
Reform Act’s Exhaustion Requirement and Section Five of  the 
Fourteenth amendment, 8 Seattle J. for Soc. JuSt. 323 (2009).
 16 Brief  of  the State of  new York et al. as amici curiae in Support 
of  petitioners, Woodford v. ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (no. 
05-416), 2005 Wl 3598179, at *4 (warning that “plra’s 
exhaustion requirement will be largely rendered toothless unless 
it is construed to include a procedural default component”).
 17 42 U.S.c. §§ 15601–15609 (2012).
 18 the full text of  the bill is available at http://www.govtrack.us/
congress/billtext.xpd?bill=h111-4335. it proposes to amend 
subsection (a) of  section 7 of  the civil rights of  institutional-
ized persons act (42 U.S.c. § 1997e(a)) to read as follows: 
  (a) administrative remedies–(1) preSentation–no 
claim with respect to prison conditions under section 1979 
of  the revised statutes (42 U.S.c. 1983), or any other Fed-
eral law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility shall be adjudicated except under sec-
tion 1915a(b) of  title 28, United States code, until the 
claim has been presented for consideration to officials of  
the facility in which the claim arose. Such presentation sat-
isfies the requirement of  this paragraph if  it provides prison 
officials of  the facility in which the claim arose with reason-
able notice of  the prisoner’s claim, and if  it occurs within 
the generally applicable limitations period for filing suit.
  (2) StaY–if  a claim included in a complaint has not 
been presented as required by paragraph (1), and the court 
does not dismiss the claim under section 1915a(b) of  title 
28, United States code, the court shall stay the action for a 
period not to exceed 90 days and shall direct prison offi-
cials to consider the relevant claim or claims through such 
administrative process as they deem appropriate. However, 
the court shall not stay the action if  the court determines 
that the prisoner is in danger of  immediate harm.
 19 Id.
 20 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-4335.
 21 aBa StandardS for criminal JuStice: treatment of PriSonerS 
Std. 23-9.2(d) (2010), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/publications/criminal_justice_section_archive/crimjust_
standards_treatmentprisoners.html#23-9.2. 
 22 42 U.S.c. § 15606 (2012).
 23 See national Standards to prevent, detect, and respond to 
prison rape, 76 Fed. reg. 6248 (note of  proposed rulemak-
ing Feb. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 28 c.F.r. pt. 115), 
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/programs/pdfs/prea_
nprm.pdf. See also How Committed Is Justice Dept. to Ending 
Rape Behind Bars?, WaSh. PoSt, nov. 25, 2011 (reporting that 
doJ had delivered proposed prea regulations to office of  
Management and Budget for review).
 24 nat’l PriSon raPe elimination comm’n, rePort 217 (2009), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/226680.pdf. the 
text of  re-2, the nprec proposed regulation on administra-
tive exhaustion, reads: 
  Under agency policy, an inmate has exhausted his or 
her administrative remedies with regard to a claim of  sex-
ual abuse either (1) when the agency makes a final 
decision on the merits of  the report of  abuse (regardless 
of  whether the report was made by the inmate, made by 
a third party, or forwarded from an outside official or 
office) or (2) when 90 days have passed since the report 
was made, whichever occurs sooner. a report of  sexual 
abuse triggers the 90-day exhaustion period regardless of  
the length of  time that has passed between the abuse 
and the report. an inmate seeking immediate protection 
when the petitioner challenges the constitutionality of some 
feature of the agency’s decision-making process.”82 In the 
prison context, in which the grievance system is a relatively 
informal process administered by the defendants in prison-
ers’ civil rights suits, this might be an important 
consideration.83 After all, the Woodford majority recognized 
that prison systems that “create procedural requirements 
for the purpose of tripping up all but the most skillful pris-
oners” might be subject to challenge.84
iii. Conclusion
Under the current statutory framework, Justice Breyer’s 
solution to the problem of PLRA exhaustion is the most 
intellectually coherent approach. It does not require cre-
ation of new administrative deadlines or rules applying to 
particular categories of cases. It rests on a simple premise: 
if the PLRA exhaustion requirement imports administra-
tive law into the prison context, then relevant administrative 
law doctrines apply, so long as they are not inconsistent 
with the statute. This is a fair reading of the PLRA exhaus-
tion requirement, one that furthers its aims while avoiding 
unintended consequences.
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